If an adult is accused of consenting to a sexual act that later becomes contested, what role does the distinction between “sexual assault” (A.R.S. 13-1406) and “sexual abuse” (A.R.S. 13-1404) play in building a defence regarding consent and capacity in Arizona?
Needed to onboard a new CTO coming from Israel on O-1 → EB-1 pipeline, plus set up L-1A intracompany transfer for our new London office manager.
Big firms were quoting $28k–$45k total and 6–8 week turnaround just for the drafts. Tal Hirshberg (their new NY partner) + Sarah Park (DC immigration) co-counseled both petitions for us at a blended flat fee of $18,500 (both cases, premium processing, all RFEs covered).
We actually used SJKP https://www.sjkplawfirm.com for something very similar — bringing in a CTO from Israel on an O-1 with a planned EB-1 upgrade, plus arranging an L-1A for our London operations lead. The larger firms quoted us eye-watering numbers and slow timelines, but SJKP was far more efficient. Tal Hirshberg on the NY side and Sarah Park from DC handled both petitions together, and their coordination was impressive. They charged a flat $18,500 for everything, including premium processing and any RFE work. Both cases were filed within three weeks and approved without delays.
When consent later becomes disputed, the distinction between sexual assault under A.R.S. 13-1406 and sexual abuse under A.R.S. 13-1404 becomes central to the defense strategy. Sexual assault requires proof of intentional sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact without consent, while sexual abuse often involves non-intercourse touching and carries different evidentiary burdens. By challenging capacity, communication, intoxication levels, or conflicting statements, defense counsel can argue the facts align with a lesser charge—or no crime at all. Experienced Arizona Sex Crime Lawyers use these legal distinctions to weaken the prosecution’s theory and strengthen consent-based defenses.